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I. INTRODUCTION
“Home from home”—in point of regulation, this idiomatic expression is
becoming an increasing reality for focal companies and their subordinates in
multinational groups.1 Facing novel sustainability challenges posed by labor
and environmental exploitation in the globalized business context, and with the
power of multinational enterprises (MNE) greatly outpacing the growth of the
international regulatory frameworks that control them,2 it is no longer unusual
for a home state to fill governance gaps and hold a focal company responsible
for activities in its supply chains beyond its national borders.3
To take business and human rights as an example, in line with the current
international regulatory framework and an overall expectation on home states as
1. In this article, the term “holding company” is used to denote a company created to buy
and own the shares of other companies, which it then controls in a group context. The term is
often used interchangeably with the concept of “parent company.” The term “focal company”
refers to a business entity that governs the supply chain and has bargaining power over its business
partners. The latter may well include holding companies.
2. International law only recognizes individuals and states as possible perpetrators of certain
human rights abuses, and does not accept private business defendants. Uta Kohl, Corporate
Human Rights Accountability: The Objections of Western Governments to the Alien Tort Statute,
63(3) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 665, 670 (2014).
3. John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human
Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, at 7 (Apr.
7, 2008). “Governance gaps” associated with the expansion of globalized businesses are defined
as “[the gap] between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of
societies to manage their adverse consequences.” Id. at 3. See also Glen Whelan, Jeremy Moon
& Marc Orlitzky, Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Embedded Liberalism: What
Chance Consensus? 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 368 (2009) (discussing the rise of transnational
corporations and their growing importance in global governance).
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key performers/duty-bearers in human rights protection, two approaches
currently form the polar extremes of a home state’s regulatory taxonomy,
reflecting the ostensibly irreconcilable impasse between human rights advocacy
groups and businesses. 4 At one end of the spectrum is a hard law regime
imposing substantive duties on corporations, with the 2003 United Nations
(U.N.) Norms being a typical instance of this.5 Towards the other end lies the
much softer U.N. “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, which defined the
nature of businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights as a social norm
“over and above compliance to laws and regulations,”6 different from the 2003
“hard” duty recommendation. 7 Despite the fact that the 2003 U.N. Norms
suffered a dismal outcome in practice,8 this espousal of progressively hard laws
to ensure that businesses uphold human rights has received a good deal of
sympathy in a number of jurisdictions. For instance, English law recently held
that holding companies could owe some duty of care to sustainability victims
harmed by their overseas subsidiaries, with the possibility of extending this wide
accountability to related institutions in global supply chains.9 Meanwhile, there
is also an assortment of international and national governance initiatives that
embody the essence of the soft “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework.
One prominent example is the latest version of Section 54 of the U.K. Modern
Slavery Act (MSA), a supply chain disclosure requirement that “merely
4. John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights xvi–
xvii, 68, 76 (2013).
5. Economic and Social Council, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). The U.N. Norms stipulate that transnational firms and other
business enterprises have corresponding legal duties within their spheres of activity and influence,
compliance be monitored by a rigid enforcement mechanism, and victims be provided with
effective remedies. Id. 15–18.
6. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy”
Framework, at 13, HR/Pub/11/04.
7. Economic and Social Council, supra note 5, 1.
8. See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 821 (2007) (discussing the business community’s fierce
opposition to the Norms). The U.N. Commission on Human Rights eventually declared that,
although there were “useful elements and ideas,” the document was ultimately a “draft proposal
[with] no legal standing.” Id.
9. Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, [6], [136]–[37]; Infra notes
58–76.
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provide[s] statutory endorsement to existing voluntary CSR [Corporate Social
Responsibility] initiatives and reporting, with no penalty for non-compliance.”10
Practice has thus far brought to life a wide usage of both regulatory approaches,
intensifying a need to examine their doctrinal and pragmatic compatibilities.
This is the analysis to which this Paper turns.
This Paper aims to utilize the corporate disclosure requirement enshrined in
Section 54 of the U.K. MSA 11 as an example of latest home states’ soft
corporate responsibility law-making efforts to foster business self-regulation,
and to explore its interactions with other progressively hard law means with
extraterritorial impacts. While Section 54 of the MSA has thus far been under
intensive scholarly spotlight, the existing literature has concentrated on the
intrinsic doctrinal and conceptual features of this latest regulatory approach,12
with its fits to the external regulatory and institutional environment explored far
less to date. Building upon and complementing existing research on social
disclosure regulation, this Paper intends to fill the current literature void by
investigating the regulatory interactions between Section 54 and recent common
law developments on companies’ duty of care and extraterritorial jurisdiction,
the institutional compatibility of Section 54 to the broad supply chain
environment that it operates in, and the resulting impacts on the enforcement of
Section 54.
This consideration of the legal and institutional disruptions in the application
of Section 54 of MSA is also one aspect of a much broader reappraisal of the
regulatory paradigm of booming global outsourcing and transnational business
activities. 13 Although globalization has, in the eyes of some, made the
10. Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Rühmkorf, The Domestic Politics of Corporate
Accountability Legislation: Struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act, SOCIO-ECONOMIC
REV. 1, 3 (2017).
11. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (U.K.).
12. See generally Rae Lindsay, Anna Kirkpatrick & Jo En Low, Hardly Soft Law: The
Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Trend Towards Mandatory Corporate Reporting on Human
Rights, 18(1) BUS. L. INT’L 29 (2017) (discussing the effectiveness of MSA’s substantive
requirements, such as mandatory reporting); see also Shuangge Wen, The Cogs and Wheels of
Reflexive Law: Business Disclosure Under the Modern Slavery Act, 43(3) J. L. & SOC’Y 327, 330
(2016) (evaluating “the intrinsic worth” and the “doctrinal and potential functional limits” of § 54
of the MSA).
13. A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of
International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133, 145 (2001).
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Westphalian sovereignty belief somewhat archaic, 14 it would not be right to
simply assume that globalization erodes the frontiers of national sovereignty.
As presented by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), diverse societies are still reasonably expected to have diverse
interests and different capacities to discharge international law obligations.15 In
the absence of a widely adopted international legal framework, national and
regional regulation plays a particularly important role in responding to “the
peaks and troughs in the international regulatory landscape,”16 with the field of
business and human rights being a typical instance. Up to the present, states
remain the primary duty bearers of human rights. Both horizontal (actions
between private actors) and vertical (states’ violations of private actors’ rights)
applications of international human rights law still depend heavily on the
contextualization of domestic laws and regulations.17 Discussions of Section
54 of the MSA and its interactions with other extraterritorial regulatory
initiatives and institutional factors, additional to its significance in securing
fundamental human rights in transnational business practice, thus also touch on
the wider ramifications of supply chain management in the contemporary world,
and even on the broad sustainability agenda underpinning all societies and
economies.18
In the meantime, delineating the detailed regulatory fabric of corporate
responsibilities in relation to human rights within such a broad ambit, loosely

14. See id. at 145 (“[globalization] is affecting a shift in authority structures, recasting state
and corporate authority and control”).
15. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The Social
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, iii (1999).
16. Ryan J. Turner, Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as
Corporate Law’s New Frontier, 17 MELB. J. INT’L L. 188, 203 (2016).
17. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44(4) VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 935 (2004); U.N.
Economic and Social Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with
regard to Human Rights, 12 (Feb. 15, 2005).
18. E.g., P. Beske & S. Seuring, Putting Sustainability into Supply Chain Management, 19(3)
SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT.: AN INT’L J. 322, 322 (2014); Galit A Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global
Supply Chains, 56 (2) HARV. INT’L L. J. 419, 419 (2015); Steve John New, Modern Slavery and
the Supply Chain: the Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility, U. OF OXFORD SAID BUS. SCH.
1 (Aug. 2015), http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/5847/1/REVISED_MSSCaproofed1format.pdf.
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defined as a corporation’s sphere of influence,19 is, to say the least, a difficult
job for a home state. Despite their mutual ambition of eradicating human rights
abuses in MNEs operations, even a cursory look at the above-mentioned soft and
hard regulatory initiatives reveals huge variations in their jurisprudence and
institutional designs, reflecting a variety of distinct ideological and nationalcontextual underpinnings; it also shows deep divisions surrounding the interests
and preferences of stakeholders impacting and affected by relevant rulemaking. 20 A large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
skeptical of the merits of laissez-faire capitalism, expressed limited confidence
in the effectiveness of soft CSR initiatives in improving corporate
performance.21 Considerable doubt has since been thrown upon soft human
rights initiatives, including those developed by MNEs, with the most critical
voices even describing these business giants as modern day “leviathans.”22

19. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) Clarifying the Concepts
of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity”, Report on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 8, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (The U.N. Global Compact asked the corporate participants to
embrace, support, and enact within their sphere of influence principles relevant to human rights
protection and promotion. A company’s sphere of influence may be interpreted as a set of
concentric circles mapping out stakeholders in a company’s value chain, with company workplace
at the core, moving outwards to supply chains, the market place, the community and the
government).
20. See, e.g., LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 10 (comparing the lawmaking process of the
U.K. MSA with the Bribery Act, and concluding that the weak force of Section 54 of the MSA was
largely due to industry actors’ less direct but successful opposition to public regulation, which was
done by way of supporting statutory endorsement to existing voluntary CSR initiatives and
reporting).
21. See Amnesty International, Submission to the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business
Enterprises,
(July
2008)
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/40000/ior800032010eng.pdf.
(Amnesty
International expressly gave support to extraterritorial hard law measures, believing they “can be
developed to address [the] lacuna [of business and human rights.]”) Much scholarly ink has also
been spilled in the legal community, voicing similar concerns and suggesting the development of
legally binding instruments regarding human rights violations. See, e.g., Aurora Voiculescu,
Human Rights and the New Corporate Accountability: Learning from Recent Developments in
Corporate Criminal Liability, 87(S2) J. BUS. ETHICS 419, 422 (2009); Justine Nolan & Luke
Taylor, Corporate Responsibility for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Rights in Search of a
Remedy?, 87(S2) J. BUS. ETHICS 433, 436 (2009).
22. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Bruce Mazlish, LEVIATHANS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW GLOBAL 2 (CUP, 2005).
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Despite substantial suspicion from NGOs, soft corporate responsibilities to
“respect” human rights manage to obtain considerable support from influential
members of the business community, including the International Chamber of
Commerce, the International Organization of Employers, and the Business and
Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD.23 At the time of this writing, the
business community, scholars and NGOs have been far from speaking with one
voice regarding the most suitable regulatory method to tackle business and
human rights at the home state level. This division has led to a simultaneous
adoption of various regulatory means with extraterritorial reach.24 Resulting
disparities in the levels of stringency of these different regulatory instruments
further lead to reciprocal disturbance in their concurrent application, providing
compelling reasons for thinking again about the issue of regulatory interaction
and compatibilities.
This Paper is therefore also set against the backdrop of an ongoing movement
towards regulating MNEs by virtue of home state regulation, to see how
transnational norms with the aim of promoting corporate accountability are
being shaped and interacting with domestic legislative frameworks. The
argument will suggest that although recent U.K. extraterritorial regulation
developments constitute a significant step forward in improving sustainability
and human rights protection in global supply chains, in terms of both extending
“hard law” protection to victims and strengthening corporate social
responsibility efforts, they lack coherence in both logic and institutional design.
Contradictions in their doctrinal underpinnings and disparities in their levels of
stringency lead to reciprocal disruptions in application.
To further clarify, it is not our aim to refute these regulatory endeavors to
tackle business and human rights challenges, with whose fundamental premises
and ideals we fully agree. Rather, we intend to bring to light the doctrinal,
contextual and practical difficulties faced by current home-state lawmaking
endeavors, particularly in the form of supply chain disclosure regulation, in the
hope of generating further insights into the complex but important issue of
imposing human rights responsibilities on MNEs. We thus hope to build a
bridge between law and other disciplines involved in the study of supply chain
23. Whelan et al., supra note 3, at 377.
24. Id. at 376.
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management, from which a valuable mutual discourse could ensue. This will
not only be of interest to policymakers, industry actors and anti-slavery activists
who “have heralded this wave of legislation as a game-changer,” 25 but also
responds to mounting awareness and concerns among consumers, investors and
other stakeholders.
The Paper is structured as follows: Upon conclusion of this introductory Part
I, Part II identifies the major approaches adopted by home states in responding
to the regulatory challenges created by global outsourcing and MNEs’ activities.
The U.K. is utilized as a primary example, with Section 54 of the MSA
embodying CSR ideals and recent case law imposing a hard law duty of care
upon holding corporations occupying the polar extremes of its extraterritorial
regulatory taxonomy on business and human rights. Part III discusses in detail
the interactions between these regulatory means in the course of their
implementation, as well as their likely disruptive effects on the enforcement of
Section 54. Part IV further highlights institutional impediments to the effective
implementation of Section 54, implicating its restricted practical effects in
increasing corporate transparency and eliminating modern slavery offences in
global chains. The discussions in Parts III and IV are supported by data-based
evidence presented in Part V. Part VI puts forward some suggestions for future
regulatory reform.
II. Regulatory Challenges brought about by Global Outsourcing
A. Global Outsourcing and Resulting Discrepancies between the Corporate
and Legal Worlds
Global outsourcing—the practice of sub-contracting business to third parties
in other countries 26 —has become a contemporary source of institutional
innovation and operational transformation, rather than a mere means of price
arbitrage. 27 Typical players involve integrated MNEs in the form of group
25. LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 10, at 2.
26. Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 425.
27. 2016 Global Outsourcing Survey: Outsourcing Accelerates Forward, DELOITTE
CONSULTING
LLP
(June
2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/fi/Documents/technology/2016%20GOS%20Ex
ec%20Summary_Nordic.pdf.
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companies and transnational contractual network enterprises. While their
global outsourcing activities significantly promote economic development and
are seen as a trigger for the next industrial revolution,28 their power and control
arrangements that defy territorial boundaries also pose novel challenges to
existing frameworks of company law, which are predominantly state-based.
Under conventional company law, the above-mentioned two ways by which
MNEs manipulate capital boundaries reduce or eliminate the potential legal
liabilities of the holding company or the focal company, which is legally isolated
from other production units within the corporate group/network, owing to the
domestic nature of corporate laws and the separate legal personality orthodoxy.29
The difficulty of distributing legal responsibility on a corporate group basis, and
the jurisdictional concern of the holding (or focal) company often being situated
in a different jurisdiction from that in which the harm occurs, lead to
accountability failures by these entities. 30 The burgeoning of outsourcing
activities under the separate legal personality principle — the fundamental
cornerstone of corporate law in almost every jurisdiction — while perhaps not
intending to, thus practically serves the purpose of expanding MNE immunity
from legal liability, concealing “the reality of economic integration of
interdependence.”31 At the very least, integral corporate operations through
external contractual relations with other companies, or through subsidiaries in
modern supply chains, lead to transaction cost reductions as well as unjustifiable
limits upon business entities’ legal responsibility. Templeman LJ remarked:
English company law possesses some curious features, which may
generate curious results. A parent company may spawn a number of
subsidiary companies, all controlled directly or indirectly by the
shareholders of the parent company. If one of the subsidiary
companies, to change the metaphor, turns out to be the runt of the litter
and declines into insolvency to the dismay of its creditors, the parent
28. Alan S. Blinders, Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr.
2006), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/offshoring-next-industrial-revolution.
29. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 21; Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1990] Ch.
433 [535]. See also Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [36]–[37] (showing the
reluctance of English courts to acknowledge “piercing the corporate veil” as a general doctrine of
law).
30. Hugh Collins, Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of
Economic Integration, 53(6) MOD. L. REV. 731, 734 (1990).
31. Id. at 742.
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company and the other subsidiary companies may prosper to the joy
of the shareholders without any liability for the debts of the insolvent
subsidiary.32
B. Economic Integration Complications in Supply Chains
Viewed from an economic perspective, the variety of business integration
forms further adds to the difficulty of imposing legal liability on transnational
corporate players. Conventional English law used to recognize ownership and
resulting control as major forms of bonding between economically integrated
organizations, on the basis of which they may be regarded as one group rather
than separate individual entities for responsibility purposes.33 In the context of
global supply chains, patterns of group company integration often exceed
connections based upon ownership and follow-on control. A typical pattern of
integration is dynamically hierarchical, with a focal company surrounded by a
number of satellites at various levels of trade, comprising both upstream
suppliers and downstream distributors.34 In practice, this pattern of outsourcing
activities has been constantly expanding, “ranging from product design to
assembly, from research and development to marketing, distribution and aftersales service.” 35 As this pattern of core and periphery, which often ignores
national boundaries, gradually stabilizes through the practice of repetitive
contracting, a steady authority relation will be formed under the mantle of a
MNE and its smaller overseas business partners.36 Such authority relations in
supply chains are no longer necessarily tied to the same forms of ownership
which are found in group companies. As remarked by Collins, they may arise
“wherever the economic dependence of one party upon the other effectively

32. Re Southard & Co. Ltd. [1979] 1 WLR 1198, 1208 (Templeman LJ).
33. Compare DHN Food Distrib. Ltd v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1
WLR 852; Antonio Gramsci Shipping Corp. & Others v. Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333; Atlas Mar.
v. Avalon Mar. (No.1) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 563, with Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC [1990] Ch. 433;
VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritek Int’l Corp. & Others [2013] UKSC 5; Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd.
[2013] UKSC 34 (placing DHN and similar judicial opinions on shaky ground).
34. Raja Kali & Javier Reyes, The Architecture of Globalization: A Network Approach to
International Economic Integration, 38(4) J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 595, 595 (2007).
35. Gene. M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a Global Economy, 72 R. ECON.
STUD. 135, 135 (2005).
36. Collins, supra note 30, at 743.
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requires compliance with the dominant party’s wishes.”37 A major MNE may
acquire sufficient leverage over a supplier in an emerging economy to be in a
position to determine its business behavior in practice. Its massive purchasing
power, huge market share and the relatively competitive labor and product prices
it can offer38 often bolster this authority. From the perspective of institutional
economics, these group organizations built upon contracts and authority are
often stable, potentially even reaching the bonding status of quasi-firms in
business reality, with individual units comprising distinct legal identities in
law.39 However, from the legal perspective, it is difficult to treat such a group
of business organizations as one unit, or hold a focal company liable for the
conduct of its satellite companies, despite their close ties in business practice.
Not least owing to this reason, the liability regime within a corporate group led
by a focal corporation is regarded as “one of the great unsolved problems of
modern company law.”40
C. Home State Regulatory Developments in Response to Global Outsourcing
While conventional laws that construct “an atomistic conception of social
relations”41 and delimit one’s legal responsibilities in relation to one’s own acts
and omissions struggle to encompass the complex patterns of economic
integration in the global ambit, novel attempts are increasingly being

37. Id. at 734. Cf. Dani Rodrik, How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?,
14(1) J. ECON. PERSP. 177, 179 (2000) (arguing that implicit contracts which are often embedded
in domestic social networks are scarce in international contexts).
38. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1998: CHAPTER FOUR
GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE 36 (1998). Compared to the labor and material costs in domestic
markets, the labor and product prices in emerging economies are much more modest. There is also
evidence that various patterns of economic integration occur to take advantage of possible savings
in this regard. According to the World Trade Organization in 1998, the production of a particular
American car generated only 37% of the production value in the United States, with the rest
generated in various foreign countries, including Japan, Germany, Taiwan, the U.K., Ireland and
Barbados. Id. This percentage is likely to be even lower in the future. See also Collins, supra note
30, at 733.
39. Robert G. Eccles, The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry, 2 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
335, 335 (1981); Collins, supra note 30, at 734. This organizational form also to a large extent
resembles the “inside contracting system” described by Williamson. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 96 (1975).
40. Clive M. Schmitthoff, Banco Ambrosiano and Modern Company Law, J. BUS. L. 361, 363
(1982).
41. Collins, supra note 30, at 731.
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implemented in response to the challenges created by global outsourcing. 42
These so-called neo-evolutionary paths presuppose that conventional
territorially-based law is static and ill-equipped for regulating rapidly changing
and increasingly complex social spheres, 43 collectively calling for further
differentiation of law into specialized areas of social ordering. The artificiality
of an entity’s domicile as a basis for regulation is increasingly recognized, and
the reach of national legislation, particularly of home states in relation to their
own business entities with operations in foreign jurisdictions, has been
extending on the basis of business rather than territorial connections.44
However, these home state regulatory initiatives are not necessarily
integrated. Taking the theme of business and human rights in the UK as an
example, there are discrepancies between mandatory corporate accountability to
protect human rights and voluntary corporate responsibility to respect human
rights, on the basis of which different regulatory means have evolved. For
instance, Section 54 of the U.K. MSA, which requires commercial organizations
to disclose in their annual slavery statement, indicating whether they have made
efforts to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in their
global supply chains, and if so, requiring a statement of the detailed steps
taken,45 could be seen as part of a pioneering attempt to advocate businesses’
soft responsibility to respect human rights, as proposed by the U.N. Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights. 46 Its general aim is to invite
multiple stakeholders in global supply chains to assume a regulatory role, setting
standards and action protocols for human rights protection in their own
corporations’ global supply chains.47 Towards this end, general norms are set
in order to steer primary actors but simultaneously leave them with a substantial
zone of freedom to engage in self-regulation; this is evidenced by Section 54
leaving substantive discretion to corporate actors to determine their own
42. Id. See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 239, 239–40 (1983) (discussing new evolutionary theories about law).
43. Teubner, id., at 274.
44. Turner, supra note 16, at 192.
45. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(4).
46. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 6, at 13.
47. Dara O’Rourke, Multi-Stakeholder Regulation: Privatizing or Socializing Global Labour
Standards?, 34(5) WORLD DEV. 899, 900 (2006).
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business undertakings, including the extent and ways in which they control
modern slavery in the course of their operations.48
On the other hand, hard-law duties are inclining in the other direction, towards
imposing substantive liabilities upon a holding/focal company where necessary,
so as to “leave the realm of voluntary corporate responsibility for the one of pure
accountability.”49 For instance, a number of recent case judgments in the U.K.
hold that a holding company might be held directly responsible if shown to be
itself at fault for sustainability or human rights violations committed by a
subsidiary, without affecting the company law cornerstone of separate legal
personality.50 In the context of global supply chains, this arguably makes it
possible to hold a focal firm liable for overseas activities of a subsidiary, or
another member of the same multinational group of companies which is in the
downstream of a supply chain.
As will be discussed below, while these two distinct regulatory approaches
have a mutual aim of enhancing human rights protection in their home
corporations’ global ambit of influence, they lack logical and implementational
coherence to “defeat the power of capital to organize itself in ways which reduce
or eliminate liabilities arising from productive activities.” 51 This calls for a
more systematic treatment of the limits of legal responsibility by reference to the
boundaries of capital units.
III. REGULATORY INTERACTION AND DISRUPTIONS TO SUPPLY CHAIN
DISCLOSURE
The latest legal developments in supply chain transparency and benchmarking
initiatives, represented by Section 54 of the U.K. MSA, offer a novel solution to
the capital boundary problem. Section 54 captures the idea of integral
economic control which binds a group of companies together, without rendering
the concept of legal entity useless. One primary legislative aim of this type of
48. Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103(2) COLUM. L. REV. 384, 384 (2003);
Wen, supra note 12, at 347–49.
49. Ramona Elisabeta Cirlig, Business and Human Rights: From Soft Law to Hard Law?, 6(2)
JURID. TRIB. 228, 228 (2016).
50. The most notable is Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [78]–[79]. See also
infra notes 58–76 and relevant texts.
51. Collins, supra note 30, at 738.
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supply chain disclosure laws, as identified by Galit Sarfaty, is to “deploy . . .
multinational companies to regulate themselves and indirectly regulate other
firms in their supply chain.” 52 On October 4, 2017, the U.K. Government
released Updated Guidance on the corporate reporting obligation in the MSA,
which is fully demonstrative of the ‘best practice’ approach represented by
Section 54, i.e., encouraging rather than obligating companies to produce more
detailed and practical MSA statements.53
Laudable legislative intent notwithstanding, it appears that the construction of
Section 54 is based upon two premises, which are both, to a large extent,
assumptions. First, as noted in Justice Brandeis’ famous line “Sunshine is the
best of disinfectants,” 54 lawmakers believe that it will be more difficult for
commercial organizations to deny their own guilt or overlook their own idleness
if they openly disclose their affairs and place them under market and public
scrutiny, thereby obliquely facilitating the enhancement of human rights
protection at the institutional level.55 Second, there is also an inherent belief
that businesses would be incentivized to disclose their efforts to combat modern
slavery, as this information would demonstrate their proactive efforts to
eradicate this social ill and thereby generate more reputation-related benefits.56
Leaving aside the first assumption, which is outside the scope of this Paper, it
is possible to take issue with the second assumption. When information about
combating modern slavery in a group context might lead to civil claims for
reparation, or even claims on criminal grounds, it is hard to imagine that any
business would accept this risk and make a full disclosure. Taking into

52. Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 435.
53. Wen, supra note 12, at 349.
54. Louis D. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914,
reprinted by Martino Fine Books, 2009).
55. As in the words of Arnold Schwarzenegger, the former California State Governor, when
promoting the California Transparency in Supply Chain Act: “This will increase transparency,
allow consumers to get more information and make more choices and motivate businesses to ensure
humane practices. . . . Of course this is not a silver bullet, by any means, but what it does is, it really
makes government and businesses work together.” Governor Highlights Legislation to Combat
Human Trafficking (Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16215.
56. See, e.g., House of Commons Committee Debate First Sitting: The Modern Slavery Bill,
(July 21, 2014) (statement of Andrew Wallis, CEO of Unseen U.K.) (“Fundamentally, [the
requirement of slavery disclosure statement] should be viewed not as red tape but as a measure to
protect British business.”).
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consideration recent common law developments on corporations’ tort liability in
the context of group companies, such risks may well turn into reality. In respect
of tortious liability, English courts have recognized that the modern degree of
economic integration merits the adoption of a more flexible approach to
territorial jurisdiction and even group responsibility, using a pattern of authority
and domination to overcome the capital boundary problem. 57 As will be
examined below, this separation from the conventional requirement of direct
ownership opens up the possibility of charging liabilities not only in parentsubsidiary relations but also between companies without direct share ownership
links, which are often observed in supply chain contexts.
A. Potential Tort Liability for Focal Companies in Global Supply Chains
Distinguishing territory from jurisdiction is not completely new under English
law. As evidenced in the trajectory of tort liability for focal companies, it began
with Lubbe and Others v. Cape PLC,58 and reached maturity in Chandler v.
Cape.59 The claimant, Mr. Chandler, was employed by Cape Building Products
Ltd, a subsidiary of the defendant company Cape PLC (hereinafter Cape). The
claimant, who worked in a factory with open sides, which emitted dust,
contracted asbestosis fifty years later.60 Both the High Court and the Court of
Appeal supported Mr. Chandler’s claim that there was a duty of care on the part
of Cape to the employees of the subsidiary company to advise on, or to ensure,
a safe system of work for them, on the basis of an assumption of responsibility
derived from the Caparo judgment.61 Given (1) that the business of the holding

57. See Collins, supra note 30, at 734.
58. Lubbe & Others v. Cape PLC [2000] 1 WLR 1545. On the other hand, the general
principles that determine whether A owes a duty of care to C in respect of the harmful activities of
B can be traced back as far as the House of Lords’ decision in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home
Office [1970] AC 1004. Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, at [46]–[56]
(Lord Briggs).
59. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525.
60. Id. at [1], [3].
61. Id. at 32, [72]–[81]; see also Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 617–8
(Lord Bridge) (stating the three ingredients for determining whether a situation gives rise to a duty
of care include that the damage should be foreseeable, that there should exist a relationship of
proximity between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed, and that the situation
should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of a given
scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other).
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company and subsidiary are in all relevant aspects the same; (2) the state of
Cape’s knowledge about the subsidiary’s work; (3) Cape’s superior knowledge
of the nature and management of asbestos risks, and; (4) that Cape knew, or
ought to have foreseen, that the subsidiary or its employees would rely on it
using its superior knowledge for the employees’ protection,62 it was held that
the claimant had established a sufficient degree of proximity to the defendant
company for it to be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on Cape
to protect the claimant from harm from asbestos in the atmosphere. 63 In
particular, the Court of Appeal emphasized that it was not necessary to show
that the holding company was in the habit of intervening in the health and safety
policies of the subsidiary; evidence showing “that the parent has a practice of
intervening in the trading operations of the subsidiary, for example production
and funding issues” would suffice for the purpose of (4).64
Although Chandler is often seen as “a source of inspiration” for the imposition
of a duty of care on the focal company of a multinational for the health and safety
of employees and others affected by the acts and omissions of an overseas
subsidiary,65 it is worth pointing out that the imposition of such a duty of care
does not involve “a novel and controversial extension of the boundaries of the
tort of negligence, beyond any established category.”66 Instead, this has been
62. See Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, at [75] (finding the test was satisfied on the basis
that throughout the claimant’s employment period Cape had employed a group medical advisor and
a scientific officer in seeking ways of suppressing asbestos dust, and many aspects of the
subsidiary’s production process had been discussed and authorized by the defendant’s board).
63. Id. at [80] (Arden LJ).
64. Id.
65. Ugljesa Grusic, Responsibilities in Groups of Companies and the Future of International
Human Rights and Environmental Litigation, 74(1) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 30, 32–33 (2015).
66. Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [46] (Lord Briggs). The
court stated
the liability of parent companies in relation to the activities of their subsidiaries is not, of
itself, a distinct category of liability in common law negligence. Direct or indirect
ownership by one company of all or a majority of the shares of another company (which
is the irreducible essence of a parent/subsidiary relationship) may enable the parent to
take control of the management of the operations of the business or of land owned by the
subsidiary, but it does not impose any duty upon the parent to do so, whether owed to the
subsidiary or, a fortiori, to anyone else. Everything depends on the extent to which, and
the way in which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in,
control, supervise or advise the management of the relevant operations (including land
use) of the subsidiary.
Id. at [49]. The court also noted
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realized by the courts’ elastic interpretation of proximity in business relations.
As Arden LJ stated, “the development of the law of negligence has to be
incremental.” 67 The conceptual elasticity of “proximity” has already been
explicitly acknowledged on several occasions in English law. As Lord Oliver
pointed out in Caparo: “‘Proximity’ … embraces not a definable concept but
merely a description of circumstances in which, pragmatically, the courts
conclude that a duty of care exists.” 68 In Chandler, the Court of Appeal
explicitly rejected the defendant’s argument that “the duty of care can only exist
if the parent company has absolute control of the subsidiary,”69 implying the
enlarged scope of the duty and the far-reaching potential of the Caparo test.70
The possibility of a wider scope for the imposition of the duty of care within a
multinational group of companies, within which “there is no limit to the models
of management and control,” 71 was further reaffirmed by Tomlinson LJ in
David Thompson v. The Renwick Group PLC,72 where he stipulated that “[i]t is
clear that Arden LJ intended this formulation to be descriptive of circumstances
in which a duty might be imposed rather than exhaustive of the circumstances
in which a duty may be imposed.”73

[t]here is no special doctrine in the law of tort of legal responsibility on the part of a
parent company in relation to the activities of its subsidiary, vis-a-vis persons affected
by those activities…. The legal principles are the same as would apply in relation to the
question whether any third party (such as a consultant giving advice to the subsidiary)
was subject to a duty of care in tort owed to a claimant dealing with the subsidiary.
Id. at [50] (quoting AAA v. Unilever PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532, [36] (Sales LJ) (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales).
67. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [63] (Arden LJ) (appeal taken from Eng.
& Wales).
68. Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 633 (Lord Oliver of Aylmerton)
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
69. Chandler [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, at [66].
70. See id. at [67], [70] (“[i]t is simply not possible to say in all cases what is or is not a normal
incident of that relationship…. The question is simply whether what the … company did
amounted to taking on a direct duty [of care.]”).
71. Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [51] (Lord Briggs SCJ)
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
72. Thomson v. Renwick Grp. PLC [2014] EWCA (Civ) 635, [33] (Tomlinson LJ). The
claimant’s claim was only rejected in this case on the grounds that the holding company did not
carry on any business at all apart from holding shares in other companies, and that there was no
evidence that the holding company either did have or should have had any knowledge of the risk
superior to that which the subsidiaries could be expected to have. Id. at [38].
73. Id. at [33].
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The legitimate provenance of finding a focal company liable in tort for its
subsidiaries, who may well be its suppliers in a global supply chain, is further
extended by the Vedanta judgment. 74 In a judgment that was subsequently
affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal stipulated in this case that
a U.K. holding company’s duty of care may, in certain circumstances, extend
not only to employees of a subsidiary but also to third parties affected by a
subsidiary’s operations, including subsidiaries that are not wholly owned. 75
Although it remains to be seen how these claims will be determined on their
merits, the fact that there had never been a reported case in this regard clearly
did not make such a claim unarguable.76
B. Regulatory Interactions between Tortious Liabilities of the Focal
Company and Supply Chain Disclosure
While the liability arising from common law negligence has only been
successfully applied thus far to holding companies in relation to their
subsidiaries’ health and safety offenses, this is significant enough to cause
disruption in the enforcement of Section 54, given that group companies are a
common pattern in global outsourcing. The Caparo ascription of responsibility
application would also likely have significant implications for supply chain
management, which often involve similarly subtle arrangements of agency and
collateral contracts. In particular, the three-part Caparo test of foreseeability,
proximity and reasonableness, which is used in affirming the assumption of
responsibility, could equally apply to supply chain relationships, particularly in
big MNEs which have power and “a practice of intervening in the trading
operations”77 of their trading partners within supply chains.78 Section 54 of the
MSA suggests that a qualifying corporation should disclose information on “the

74. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [52]–[62].
75. Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528 [83] (Simon LJ) (appeal taken
from Eng. & Wales).
76. See id. at [88] (“If it were otherwise the law would never change.”).
77. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (Arden LJ) (appeal taken from Eng.
& Wales).
78. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [49] (provided that between these trading partners there
exists direct or indirect ownership by one company of all or a majority of the shares of another
company).
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organization’s structure, its business and its supply chains”79 and “the parts of
its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and human
trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage that
risk.” 80 This disclosure conveniently would constitute direct evidence for
potential claimants against the focal company in proving foreseeability and
proximity, given that the suppliers, under repetitive contracts with and the
authority of the focal company, will also likely rely upon the focal company
deploying its superior knowledge or expertise in avoiding modern slavery.81
The evidential significance of sustainability reports published by
corporations, including reports involving modern slavery information, in
establishing proximity and reasonableness was clearly stipulated by Lord
Bingham in Lubbe.82 As mentioned, the main issue of determining the liability
of a parent company involves the control that it exercises over and the advice it
gives to its subsidiary company. Much of the evidence presented to any such
inquiry would, in the ordinary way, “be documentary and much of it would be
found in the offices of the parent company, including minutes of meetings,
reports by directors and employees on visits overseas and correspondence.”83
Considering the four factors that the Court of Appeal explicated in Chandler,
one would expect that the last three of the required elements, including the
parent’s superior knowledge of the risk, are all likely to be satisfied if the parent
corporation provides details about “the parts of its business and supply chains
where there is a risk of slavery and human trafficking taking place, and the steps
it has taken to assess and manage that risk” as required by Section 54 of the
MSA.84
Practice has already seen real reparation claims following corporations’
modern slavery disclosures. A recent class action suit was filed by a consumer
against the U.S. retailing giant Costco and several of its suppliers, claiming that
the presence of forced labor in its seafood supply chain is contradictory to the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(5).
Id. § 54(5)(d).
See supra notes 33–40 (discussing the authority of a focal firm in supply chain contexts).
Lubbe & Others v. Cape PLC, [2000] 1 WLR 1545 [20].
Id.
U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(5).
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statements made under the provisions of the Supply Chain Transparency Act.85
A similar class action suit was also brought against Nestlé. 86 Under such
circumstances, the realization of the legislative intent of supply chain disclosure
regulation is likely to be disrupted, and corporations’ incentives to disclose
comprehensive and extensive information would be reduced; when a detailed
disclosure of supply chain management and control of modern slavery might
potentially lead to direct liability in supply chains, it is predictable that focal
companies subject to Section 54 will be tempted to make a tick-the-box
disclosure only, or even simply deny any action on or knowledge of modern
slavery in their supply chains. In both cases they will have fulfilled their
statutory duty of disclosure as a commercial organization, and will be regarded
as having properly disclosed under Section 54 by simply stating that they have
taken no relevant action during the financial year.87 Given the additional risk
of reputational damage, commercial organizations and people who are “the
directing mind and will” of these companies88 will, at the very least, be cautious
about what to disclose when the information might be used as evidence, thereby
putting themselves at future risk. As stated by New, “Forced labor is an issue
of such legal gravity that continued, knowing engagement could constitute direct
complicity in criminal behavior, a much more serious situation for the firm than
‘mere’ reputational damage.” 89 One may thus see potentially perverse
incentives for corporations “not to regulate their supply chains . . . for fear of
generating the factum for a cause of action in tort,” although as a matter of policy
85. See Sarah K. Rathke et al., Litigation Fallout from All This Supply Chain Transparency
Legislation (or, These Things Have Teeth!) (or, The Cycle of Misfortune), NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 26,
2015),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/litigation-fallout-all-supply-chain-transparencylegislation-or-these-things-have (noting that the class action suit, Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5524 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016), “may be the first
lawsuit of its kind, [but] it certainly won’t be the last.”).
86. Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015). Neither Sud nor
Barber made substantive headway as both claims were dismissed by the trial courts.
Sud, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5524, re-filing dismissed, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal.
2017), aff’d, 731 Fed. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2018); Barber 154 S. Supp. 3d 954, aff’d, 730 Fed.
App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2018).
87. U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(4)(b).
88. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153, 171 (appeal taken from Eng. &
Wales) (establishing a theory of corporate liability in which certain people, such as directors and
superior officers, represent companies’ directing mind and will).
89. New, supra note 18, at 4.
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the law does not intend to encourage such willful passiveness among
corporations.90
C. Developments on Cross-Border Corporate Sustainability and the
Evidential Implications of Supply Chain Disclosure
1. The Evidential Value of Corporate Disclosure Documents
A number of recent case judgments,91 in particular Vedanta Resources PLC
and Another v. Lungowe 92 and Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 93 further
consolidate the significant evidential effect of public documents on cross-border
corporate sustainability. These cases currently concern the establishment of
jurisdiction only: overseas claimants, as third parties allegedly harmed by a
subsidiary’s local operations, are trying to establish the English courts’
jurisdiction to try claims against parent companies and their overseas
subsidiaries.94 However, these jurisdiction claims merit an examination of the
substance of the case, and thereby require consideration of whether there was
some plausible case between the overseas claimants and the holding company,95
involving a purportedly simple question of law that Chandler was trying to
solve: whether an English parent company owes a duty of care to those affected
by a subsidiary’s overseas operations.96
90. Turner, supra note 16, at 197.
91. See, e.g., AAA & Others v. Unilever PLC & Anor [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1532. Regardless
of the High Court Judge Elisabeth Laing J’s decision that there was a sufficient degree of proximity
and although there was inadequate foreseeability or reasonableness to establish viable claims
against Unilever, the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that the appeal should be dismissed by
reason of the proximity point in relation to Unilever, and it is pointless to consider issues of
foreseeability and reasonableness in terms of the imposition of a duty of care. The Court of Appeal
found insufficient detail in the record regarding the English company’s guidance and advice to the
subsidiary to establish proximity. Id. at [15].
92. Vedanta Res. PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 (Lord Briggs, unanimous decision)
(appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
93. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191 (Eng. & Wales).
94. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [3]–[4]; Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [196].
95. See, e.g., Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, [63] (Simon LJ) (“In
general, a real issue between the relevant parties is to be equated with a properly arguable case or
serious question to be tried . . . The more doubtful the point of law, the more cautious the court
should be, since the question of law goes to the existence of the jurisdiction.”).
96. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525; Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990]
2 AC 605 (HL) 609 (Lord Oliver of Aylmerton) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales). Such a duty
of care may arise where the parent company: (a) has taken direct responsibility for devising a
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In both Vedanta and Okpabi the claimants relied on the sustainability reports
disclosed by the defendants, implicating the potential evidential effects of the
modern slavery reports required by Section 54 in establishing the human rights
liabilities of parent corporations.97 For instance, in Vedanta the report issued
by the Vedanta company, entitled “Embedding Sustainability,” contained
information about the board of Vedanta exercising oversight of all Vedanta’s
subsidiaries, and referred to problems with discharges into water as an
example. 98 There were also highlights in Vedanta’s public statements
regarding its commitment to address environmental risks and technical
shortcomings in the subsidiary’s mining infrastructure.99 These are the kind of
standardized statements that one often finds in corporate reports on sustainability
issues — for instance, the statement that “we have a governance framework to
ensure that surface and ground water do not get contaminated by our
operations.”100 However, they were relied upon by the plaintiff and the courts,
in support of a well arguable case that the parent company Vedanta had either
taken direct responsibility or had controlled the operations which had given rise
to the claim.101 As stipulated by Lord Briggs, with whom other Supreme Court
judges agreed, there does not exist a general principle that a parent could never
incur a duty of care in respect of the activities of a particular subsidiary merely

material health and safety policy; or (b) controls the operations which give rise to the claim. In
these cases the Court of Appeal used the three-part formulation (foreseeability, proximity, and
reasonableness) set out by the House of Lords in Caparo, to see whether a properly arguable claim
that a duty of care was owed in the particular case could be established. Id.
97. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [8]; Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, at [43].
98. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [58]; Vedanta [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, at [84].
99. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [55].
100. Vedanta [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528, at [84].
101. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [61] (Lord Briggs). The Court stated
I regard the published materials in which Vedanta may fairly be said to have asserted its
own assumption of responsibility for the maintenance of proper standards of
environmental control over the activities of its subsidiaries, and in particular the
operations at the Mine, and not merely to have laid down but also implemented those
standards by training, monitoring and enforcement, as sufficient on their own to show
that it is well arguable that a sufficient level of intervention by Vedanta in the conduct of
operations at the Mine may be demonstrable at trial, after full disclosure of the relevant
internal documents of Vedanta and KCM and of communications passing between them.
See also id. at [84]–[90] (Simon LJ).

Winter 2020]Supply Chain Disclosure under the Modern Slavery Act

147

by laying down group-wide policies and guidelines, and expecting the
management of each subsidiary to comply with them.102
Likewise, in Okpabi the claimants relied on the contents of several
Sustainability Reports published by the defendant company, highlighting the
commitment of the parent company to control and direct the subsidiary’s
environmental performance. 103 Although the Court of Appeal rejected the
claimants’ argument by a 2–1 majority, the evidential value of public reports
issued by the defendant company was explicitly acknowledged by all appellate
judges.104 Simon LJ, who was among the majority, emphasized that he “would
accept that statements made in the … Sustainability Report were particularly
relevant to the existence of the duty of care relied on by the claimants.” 105
Likewise, Sir Geoffrey Vos opined that the regulatory text (that puts forward
disclosure standards) means that such statements “are more likely to be true, and
so should be accorded greater evidential weight.”106
Furthermore, as evidenced in Okpabi, it still remains debatable as to the extent
to which the disclosed information would be deemed specific enough to
establish proximity between the entities, and the evidential value of corporate
disclosure, including modern slavery reports, in establishing the focal
company’s duty of care might turn out to be even more significant. 107 For
instance, based on exactly the same facts on which Simon LJ and Sir Geoffrey
Vos rejected the appeal, Sales LJ adopted a more contextual approach when

102. See Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [52]–[53] (Lord Briggs) (giving two examples in which
the parent would be held liable in respect of the activities of one of its subsidiaries by laying down
group-wide policies and expecting the subsidiaries to comply: if the unsafe system of work had
formed part of a group-wide policy publicized by the parent, which had been applied by subsidiaries
around the world; or if the parent claims in published materials to exercise a sufficient degree of
supervision and control of its subsidiaries, but it does not in fact do so.).
103. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [153], [163].
104. Id. at [163].
105. Id. at [67] (Simon LJ).
106. Id. at [188] (Sir Geoffrey Vos). These two judges only declined to allow the claim
because they felt the disclosed corporate policies and documents were not specifically targeting the
subsidiary company, and thus only showed that a parent company had taken steps to ensure that
there were proper control mechanisms in place over all subsidiaries. Nevertheless, there might be
an arguable case if relevant corporate policies and processes were more specific, demonstrating the
parent’s endeavors to exercise control over a particular subsidiary. Id.
107. Id. at [2]–[4].
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considering the issue of proximity and was in favor of allowing an appeal:108 “
. . . on the facts of a particular case, the issuing of mandatory instructions
combined with close monitoring, intervention and enforcement, may show that
there has been a material assumption of responsibility.” 109 In Sales LJ’s
opinion in Okpabi, the group-wide instructions issued by RDS provided a
practical means for RDS to disseminate expertise and to control at least some
aspects of the management of its operating companies, which helped the
claimants to assert an arguable claim that RDS assumed a material degree of
responsibility in relation to the management of the pipeline and facilities
according to the criteria in Chandler and Vedanta.110 In particular, the fact that
the losses due to oil spillage in Nigeria were singled out in the Shell
Sustainability Report 2014 was construed as strong evidence that the parent “had
a particularly strong interest in ensuring that the management of the pipeline and
facilities was conducted effectively and thus was proactive in assuming control
of the operational decisions about how to manage the risk of oil and spillage
from them.”111
2. Extended Corporate Proximity from Ownership to Authority
In the Vedanta case, the subsidiary company, KCM, was not a 100%
subsidiary of Vedanta. 112 However, based on the materials published by
Vedanta, it was not difficult for the courts to find that Vedanta’s ultimate control
of KCM was “not to be regarded as any less than it would be if wholly
owned.”113 The Okpabi judgment went even further, stipulating that the fact
that the parent company did not directly hold shares in the subsidiary was
irrelevant in establishing the duty of care of the parent company, since the parent
could still exert practical control over the subsidiary.114 These are explicit signs
of English courts starting to depart from the conventional emphasis on

108. Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525, [31]–[32].
109. Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [172] (Sales LJ).
110. Id. at [171].
111. Id. at [162].
112. Vedanta Res. PLC & Another v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [2] (Lord Briggs) (appeal
taken from Eng. & Wales).
113. Id. at [2].
114. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, at [172] (Sales LJ).
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ownership in groups towards authority when establishing proximity, and
focusing more on whether the group is managed integrally along functional
lines. For instance, the existence of global standards within a company group
was considered by Sales LJ in Okpabi as capable of providing a mechanism for
the projection of real practical executive control by the parent’s CEO and key
organs over the affairs of the subsidiary, if they wished to assume such
control.115 This is an additional warning sign to corporations operating using
forms of authority bonding, which often occurs in supply chains. Predictably,
the evidential value of public information disclosed by the company in
establishing a holding company’s duty of care largely remains a matter of
detailed factual analysis, which will only make MNEs more careful in choosing
and formulating their methods and the content of their disclosure, thereby largely
thwarting the legislative purpose of Section 54.
This area of law is far from being consolidated, since the claimants in Okpabi
are seeking to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Vedanta case remains to be
judged on its merits. 116 In the meantime, however, based on existing case
judgments it seems that the more a company becomes involved in the control
and publication of information about its overseas connected companies’
operations, the more likely it is to be plunged into litigation and held liable for
negligence by overseas subsidiaries and companies connected through supply
contracts. Thus far, connections acknowledged by judicial authorities have
been confined to those between parents and subsidiaries, but this type of parentsubsidiary connection often exists in supply chains, if it is possible to
demonstrate the necessary degree of foreseeability, proximity and
reasonableness.117

115. Id. at [161].
116. Chris Owen & Adam Bristow, Okpabi v. Shell Appeal Highlights Important Points
Regarding Parent Co. Liability, ELEXICA (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.elexica.com/en/legaltopics/dispute-resolution-commercial/260218-okpabi-v-shell.
117. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, at [24] (Simon LJ). “It is clear that the three-part test
set out in the Caparo case is not a forensic equation to which values may be attached that yield the
answer to whether or not a duty is owed.” Id.
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3. The Enforcement Tension between the Extraterritorial Duty of Care and
Supply Chain Disclosure
A significant tension is therefore evident in the trajectory of the latest case
law developments: MNEs in general, and particularly under supply chain
disclosure regulation, are encouraged to construct and implement measures to
prevent their suppliers/subsidiaries from engaging in human rights abuses.118
However, there also exists a risk that the imposition and enforcement of such
measures could be construed as the focal companies’ control of and/or
acceptance of responsibility for the operations of that subsidiary/supplier. 119
Existing laws on the duty of care for parent corporations place significant
emphasis on the nature of the working relationships between business entities,
in which documentary evidence issued by the entities plays an important role.
In this regard, Vedanta and Okpabi provided clear examples of how detailed
sustainability disclosure can backfire; the evidence, in which sustainability
reports played a key part, was considered to support the case that “there was a
pattern of distribution of expertise and control in relation to the handling of the
risk of oil spills in [Nigeria].”120
To make things even more complicated, the disputable status of the law
increases the likelihood of similar future claims against MNEs, seeking to rely
on documents issued by the corporations themselves which are available in the
public domain. Hopes have been raised that claims originally brought against
subsidiaries may be brought before the courts of their parent companies’ home
states and remedies may be sought in that jurisdiction.121 Although judgments
in the Court of Appeal in two recent cases denied access to courts in parent
companies’ home states for the victims of extraterritorial human rights
violations, 122 the evidential value of public reports including sustainability

118. Id. at [71], [162].
119. Owen & Bristow, supra note 116.
120. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, [165] (Sales LJ). Sales LJ also explained why judges
tend to attach significance to public disclosure—it has evidently not been easy for claimants to find
internal witnesses (from the defendant company) who were willing to act in a certain sense as
whistleblowers. Id. at [168].
121. Owen & Bistrow, supra note 116.
122. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191; AAA & Others v. Unilever PLC & Anor [2018] EWCA
(Civ) 1532 (appeal taken from EWHC (QB)).
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information was widely appreciated.123 It is likely that as long as the law is not
completely clarified and the possibility of focal companies being dragged into
lawsuits remains, MNEs will continue to be deterred from issuing detailed
sustainability reports with details, since such hearings are costly in terms of both
time and expenditure. Lord Neuberger warned in VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritek
International Corp. 124 about the risk of vexatious litigations if a hearing is
expensive and time-consuming. 125 Unfortunately, the expenditure of time,
effort, and financial resources in recent jurisdiction disputes has been significant,
to the extent that they became “wholly self-defeating.” 126 For instance, in
Okpabi the total length of the witness statements ran to over 2,000 pages of
material, and the parties’ ‘skeleton arguments’ ran to 259 pages.127 In Vedanta,
the Supreme Court further warned against the disproportionate way in which
these jurisdiction issues have been litigated, measured by the statistics about the
materials placed before the Court.128 As summarized by Lord Briggs, “[t]he
parties’ two written cases (ignoring annexes) ran to 294 pages. The electronic
bundles included 8,945 pages. No less than 142 authorities were deployed,
spread over 13 bundles, in relation to an appeal which, on final analysis,
involved only one difficult point of law.”129 The cost and effort burdens on
MNEs will incentivize them to avoid this type of litigation, and information
disclosed in public documents which might be used as evidence against them
will therefore be brief and concise. Given that Section 54 of the MSA imposes
no penalty for poor-quality disclosure, corporations that wish to avoid public
disapproval are likely to disclose minimal or selective information in an indirect
and non-confrontational manner, rather than straightforward opposition and
failure to disclose.130
123. Okpabi 2018 EWCA (Civ) 191, at [62, 67, 153]; AAA & Others [2018] EWCA (Civ)
1532, at [40].
124. VTB Capital PLC v. Nutritek Int’l Corp. & Others [2013] UKSC 5, [82] (Lord
Neuberger).
125. Id. (“hearings concerning the issue of appropriate forum should not involve masses of
documents, long witness statements, detailed analysis of the issues and long argument.”).
126. Okpabi [2018] EWCA (Civ) 191, at [21] (Sales LJ).
127. Id. at [17].
128. Vedanta [2019] UKSC 20, at [6]–[14].
129. Id. at [10].
130. See LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 10, at 8–10 (arguing that Section 54 of the U.K.
MSA was a result of corporations’ displacement efforts during the policy-making process).
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE
A. Structural and Compositional Intricacies of Supply Chains
As well as its incompatibilities with regulatory approaches to extraterritorial
tortious liability, Section 54 of the MSA is also restrained in practice by
institutional barriers, not least the structural and compositional complications of
supply chains. Most of the supply chain and modern slavery literature
concentrates on criminal behavior occurring in goods and services supply
chains.131 Likewise, Section 54 in its current form does not distinguish between
product supply chains and labor supply chains. 132 However, the complex
channels of labor supply—contract employment agencies, local gang-masters,
and the fact that they often provide people to work for a company without being
counted as direct employees—tend to get around supply chain governance and
labor standards, taking advantage of legislative ambiguity in the terms
“supplier” and “employee.” 133 Under pressure to engage in responsible
business practices, many companies spend vast sums of money on tracing the
source of their products and making their product supply chains transparent.134
However, the stark reality is that labor chains remain invisible for the most part.
As shown by empirical evidence in the field, many businesses experience
pragmatic difficulties in detecting modern slavery practices in their labor
chains.135 The high structural volatility of global value chains has already been
shown to have a significant impact on the actual operating effects of corporate
policies, in some circumstances even rendering them unfit for purpose.136 In

131. Turner, supra note 16, at 205.
132. See generally Modern Slavery Act 2015, ch. 30, § 54 (UK).
133. New, supra note 18, at 4. For instance, the precise conceptual boundaries of forced
labour may vary, the radical view being that all workers under a capitalism regime are wage slaves.
Marxism is the typical example of this. Id. at 2.
134. Thomas Wailgum, Supply Chain Spending on the Rise, CIO (Jan. 3, 2008),
https://www.cio.com/article/2437386/supply-chain-spending-on-the-rise.html.
135. Andrew Crane & Genevieve LeBaron, Why Businesses Fail to Detect Modern Slavery,
THE CONVERSATION, Sept. 11, 2017, http://theconversation.com/why-businesses-fail-to-detectmodern-slavery-at-work-82344. In Crane and LeBaron’s research into modern slavery, a senior
executive of a major British hotel chain admitted bitterly that “I can tell you the farm where the
steak on your plate came from. Probably even the name of the cow. But we have no idea where
the workers came from that work in our kitchens.” Id.
136. Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 435.
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the meantime, multi-tier supply chains, and the complex systems of transnational
managerial control through which they operate, were ignored in the legislative
drafting of Section 54, deliberately or otherwise. If one takes a close look at
the wording of Section 54 of the MSA, the term ‘supply chain’ is not clearly
defined for the purpose of this provision, with the consequence that the scope of
the suppliers covered by corporate policies and actions is not at all clear.137
In this regard, a comparable provision—Section 1714.43(a)(1) of the
Californian Civil Code—avoids confusion by clearly targeting a “direct supply
chain for tangible goods offered for sale.”138 Some argue that Section 54’s
omission of the adjective “direct” implicates the U.K. legislators’ intention to
accommodate a broader reach than the Californian peer.139 Indeed, practice has
thus far supported the need to expand legislative reach; modern slavery problems
frequently occur upstream at the less visible sub-supplier levels, rather than at
the focal company or among the first-tier suppliers with whom a focal firm has
direct contractual relationships.140 However, this is only scholarly speculation
rather than an authoritative interpretation. The enforceability of Section 54, at
least at present, is significantly undermined by these conceptual and scope
ambiguities. As commented by O’Neill, proclamations about combating
crimes including modern slavery without establishing or identifying institutions
where corresponding claims for rights or redress may be lodged are, at best, “a
premature rhetoric of rights (that) may have political point and impact . . . (and)
at worst a rhetoric of rights (that) can inflate expectations while masking a lack
of claimable entitlements.”141
B. Limits of the Focal Company in Sustainable Chain Management
Behind the supply chain governance initiatives and the growing body of
research suggesting that focal companies should expand their sustainability
137. New, supra note 18, at 2–4.
138. Turner, supra note 16, at 194.
139. Id. at 195.
140. J.L. Glover, D. Champion, K.J. Daniels & A.J.D. Dainty, An Institutional Theory
Perspective on Sustainable Practices across the Dairy Supply Chain, 152 INT’L J. PROD. ECON.
102, 102–11 (2014) (highlighting various infrastructural challenges to sustainable supply chain
management).
141. ONORA O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF
PRACTICAL REASONING 133 (1996).
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strategies to the sub-suppliers’ level142 lies another implicit assumption, which
is that focal companies are able to affect or even manage their sub-suppliers’
practices. 143 From the perspective of buying firms, this “chain liability” 144
effect demands that their sustainability management strategies penetrate as far
as second-tier suppliers and even beyond. This assumption should not be taken
for granted, as the complexity of supply chains also affects the capacity and
quality of sustainable supply chain management by the focal company. To
begin with, the lack of contractual relationships between a buying firm and its
second-tier suppliers, coupled with asymmetric information on the exact number
or identity of its sub-suppliers,145 often render the focal company’s practice of
implementing sustainability strategies at sub-supplier levels difficult. Focal
companies are usually located in developed economies, whereas sub-suppliers
are in emerging economies. The multi-dimensional geographical, regulatory
and cultural distances between a focal company and its sub-suppliers, combined
with limited resource availability at the first-tier supplier’s level, which often
serve as agent of the focal company, further compound the challenge of
achieving sustainable goals in supply chains.146 Up to the present, managing
sub-suppliers in the context of sustainability and human rights protection is still
the exception rather than the norm, 147 and the extent of supply chain
management also varies significantly, affected by power asymmetries as well as

142. E.g., Miriam Wilhelm, Constantin Blome, Ellen Wieck & Cheng Yong Xiao,
Implementing Sustainability in Multi-Tier Supply Chains: Strategies and Contingencies in
Managing Sub-Suppliers,182 INT’L J. PROD. ECON. 196, 197 (2016); Thomas Choi & Tom Linton,
Don’t Let Your Supply Chain Control Your Business, HARV. BUS. REV. 112 (2011).
143. See, e.g., 541 Parl. Deb. HC (6th ser.) (2012) col. 172 (U.K.) (Fiona Mactaggart, MP)
(commenting on the disclosure obligation that “in enabling public information to be provided . . .
[it] aims to use the power of the purchaser to prevent slavery and exploitation”); see also Carlos
Mena, Andrew Humphries & Thomas Y. Choi, Toward a Theory of Multi-Tier Supply Chain
Management, 49(2) J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 58, 59 (2013).
144. R van Tulder, J van Wijk & A Kolk, From Chain Liability to Chain Responsibility, 85(2)
J. BUS. ETHICS 399, 409 (2009).
145. Wilhelm et al., supra note 142, at 196; Thomas Y. Choi, Kevin J. Dooley & Manus
Runtusanatham, Supply Networks and Complex Adaptive Systems: Control versus Emergence,
19(3) J. OPS. MGMT. 351, 358 (2001).
146. Miriam Wilhelm, Constantin Blome, Vikram Bhakoo, & Antony Paulraj, Sustainability
in Multi-tier Supply Chains: Understanding the Double Agency Role of the First-tier Supplier, 41
J. OPS. MGMT. 42, 53 (2016).
147. Wilhelm et al., supra note 142, at 196.
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dependencies between supply chain members for critical resources or
components.148
Second, the strategies that focal companies use to manage sub-suppliers also
differ significantly, ranging from delegating authority to tier 1 suppliers where
there is no direct connection between the buying firm and the tier 2 supplier,149
to working with third parties in extending sustainability to sub-suppliers,150 and
to forming “closed triads” in which buying firms directly manage subsuppliers.151 The holistic implementation of practices beyond the boundaries
of a buying firm is thus characterized by wide diversities in the focal company’s
power, the industry in which the supply chain resides, the number and location
of production facilities, infrastructural characteristics in transportation and
telecommunications, the extent of public scrutiny, and the extent of dependency
and distance between supply chain members, which will need to be taken into
account in future law-making.152
C. Impacts of the General Socio-Economic Environment
Other than the institutional complications of supply chains discussed above,
the social complexities and dangers that might be involved in disclosing modern
slavery in the global context may also deter efficient and full disclosure.
Modern slavery, particularly in the form of human trafficking and forced labor,
is a process rather than an isolated event, often involving the participation of
criminal gangs who may use threats and various means of violence to prevent
their crimes from being disclosed.153 Just as acutely noted by Quirk, “[modern
slavery] does not denote a uniform condition, but covers a spectrum of practices,
involving varying degrees of consent, coercion, treatment, and autonomy.”154
Rather than seeing modern slavery as an exogenous problem that companies
148. Id. at 196–97; Crane & LeBaron, supra note 135.
149. Mena et al., supra note 143, at 60; Wilhelm et al., supra note 142, at 196.
150. Wilhelm et al., supra note 142, at 197.
151. Id. at 196.
152. See, e.g., id. (discussing examples of firms that have implemented such an approach);
Elcio M. Tachizawa & Chee Yew Wong, Towards a Theory of Multi-Tier Sustainable Supply
Chains: A Systematic Literature Review 19(5) SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 643, 657 (2014).
153. New, supra note 18, at 5.
154. Joel Quirk, The Anti-Slavery Project: Linking the Historical and Contemporary, 28 HUM.
RTS. Q. 565, 576 (2006).
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have to address, it should be seen as an endemic feature of socio-economic
systems that are sometimes partly constituted by the companies themselves.155
Imposing disclosure obligations on companies without tackling the socioeconomic contexts in which modern slavery develops will not help much in fully
eradicating the social ill.
V. DATA-BASED EVIDENCE
Given the multi-faceted elements that interact with and disrupt the
implementation of statutory disclosure requirements, it is unlikely that Section
54 of the MSA will have a substantial effect in incentivizing focal companies to
make detailed and accurate disclosure about their anti-slavery performance in
supply chains. This has been proved by empirical evidence. Up to March 23,
2020, of the 19,712 U.K. companies exceeding the £36 million annual turnover
threshold, 156 just about half —10,517 companies—submitted reports to the
Modern Slavery Registry, and only 23% of the submitted reports met all the
minimum requirements set out in the MSA.157 If these disappointing figures
can to a certain extent be excused by the fact that it is not mandatory to disclose
on the Registry’s website, a closer look at the contents of MSA reports is just as
unsatisfactory. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC)
assessed the first year’s MSA Reports released by FTSE 100 companies, and
concluded that “[while] there is a welcome cluster of leading companies taking
robust action … the majority show a lacklustre response to the [MSA] at best.”158
In other research targeting reports submitted by companies operating in sectors
that are widely recognized as a heightened risk, almost two thirds did not make
reference to the specific risks of slavery and human trafficking in relevant supply

155. Id. at 577 (describing modern slavery as effectively a “multi-faceted continuum.”) See
also New, supra note 18, at 8.
156. FAME, BUREAU VAN DIJK, http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/companyinformation/national-products/fame (last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
157. Modern
Slavery
Registry,
BUS.
&
HUM. RTS.
RESOURCE
CTR.,
https://www.modernslaveryregistry.org/ (last updated on Mar. 23, 2020).
158. First Year of FTSE 100 Reports under the UK Modern Slavery Act: Towards
Elimination?, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR. (last visited Mar. 24, 2020, 9:59 AM),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/first-year-of-ftse-100-reports-under-the-uk-modernslavery-act-towards-elimination.
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chains or specific sectors.159 Without correct identification of the risks, it will
be difficult for firms to take effective action to address those risks. Many
statements are not even compliant with the basic requirements of the legislation,
with the majority failing to address the six topic areas listed in Section 54 in any
detail.160 Indeed, viewed in the global context, firms tend to allege that they are
against modern slavery and forbid their suppliers from engaging in it. In many
cases, firms assert that their prohibition must be cascaded down the chain of
production, going beyond the first tier of supplying firms. However, this kind
of assertion tends to be restricted to the policy level—few companies thus far
have disclosed their or their suppliers’ previous involvement in modern slavery,
even if passive or unrecognized.161 Company policies also tend to be highly
uniform and relatively abstract, revealing little information about their actual
performance. This has been described by Coombs and Halladay as a “pseudopanopticon.”162 The conventional corporate policy and monitoring regime has
thus far proved only to provide room for manipulation and game-playing163 in
responding to less challenging environmental issues in supply chains, not to
mention dealing with the much more severe problem of modern slavery.
VI. SUGGESTIONS
Although the ascription of responsibility has thus far primarily focused on
group companies and depends on the individual circumstances in each case,
including the nature, scope and extent of the holding company’s control, these
legal developments still have significant implications for supply chain
management, which often involve similarly subtle arrangements of agency and
collateral contracts. From the home state regulatory perspective, this requires

159. CORE Coalition, Risk Averse? Company Reporting on Raw Material and Sector-Specific
Risks under the Transparency in Supply Chains Clause in the U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, 4
(Sept. 2017) (providing examples of heightened risk sectors as “garment production; hotels and
accommodation; construction; football clubs … and outsourcing companies”).
160. Id. at 8.
161. Adam S. Chilton & Gail Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, in
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Economics, No.766, 1, 20 (2016).
162. W. Timothy Coombs & Sherry J. Holladay, The Pseudo-Panopticon: the Illusion Created
by CSR-Related Transparency and the Internet, 18(2) CORP. COMM.: AN INT’L J. 212, 213–17
(2013).
163. New, supra note 18, at 6; Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89
WASH. L. REV. 747, 787 (2014).
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the acknowledgement of modern forms of corporate integration, so as to develop
a coherent regulatory approach that defines the extent of the human rights
responsibilities (accountability) of focal companies. In order to solve the
regulatory and institutional tensions discussed above, the experiences of several
other jurisdictions might be of referential value to the U.K., both in reconciling
corporate disclosure and other regulatory initiatives, and in enhancing the
extraterritorial reach of home states towards their companies’ overseas supply
chains, as explicated below.
To begin with, eradicating modern slavery not only requires the improvement
of regulatory standards in relation to disclosure, wages, working conditions and
collective bargaining rights in both home and host countries, but also demands
the effective detection of modern slavery in the first place. Section 54 of the
MSA does not dictate the content of corporate disclosures, instead merely
providing guidance as to what information may be included in an organization’s
slavery and human trafficking statement, 164 which enables corporations to
formulate their statements in ways beneficial to them. In this regard, the
transparency required by the Californian Act seems to be more robust—each
eligible retail seller or manufacturer must, at a minimum, disclose to what extent,
if any, that he does each of the following: the verification of product supply
chains to evaluate risks of slavery; conducting audits of suppliers to evaluate
supplier compliance with corporate standards; requiring direct suppliers’
certification of material compliance; maintaining internal accountability
standards for employees or contractors, as well as procedures for those who fail
to meet the standards; and the provision of training for employees and managers
who have direct responsibility for supply chain management. 165 Of course,
corporations can tick “no” to all the above questions, but then the disclosure
statement will presumably become evidence in a name-and-shame exposure.
Complex patterns of economic integration in contemporary groups and supply
chains also consist of more than one form of bond—for example, ownership,
authority and contract— which the law needs to take into full account in order
to develop principles accordingly. For instance, a repetitive pattern of
contracting for essentially the same goods or services should suffice as evidence
164. U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54(5).
165. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c) (2012).
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of a significant degree of economic integration which may warrant a disclosure.
Furthermore, this should not be limited to repetitive bilateral contracts, since
multiple relations may operate in these massively integrated networks. 166
Further clarification is also necessary in terms of sufficient degrees of proximity
and control in the Caparo test, so that disclosure regulation would well integrate
with the hard law duty of care. In this regard, in France, disclosure of human
rights protection activities has now become part of an integral framework of
corporate duties that corporations must adhere to, rather than an isolated
undertaking that corporations have the discretion to ignore.167 An amendment
to the French Commercial Code creates an obligation for companies to prevent
and mitigate environmental, health and human rights harms resulting from their
activities, including those carried out by their subsidiaries and supply chains.168
This duty is composed of three elements (stages), including “elaboration,
disclosure and the effective implementation of a ‘vigilance plan,’” 169 which
should include “due diligence measures to identify risks and to prevent serious
violations of human rights … health and safety and the environment.”170 In a
corporate group, the duty could be imposed on the holding company to monitor
and ensure that the vigilance plan is complied with within the sphere of
influence. Policies and measures to address extraterritorial challenges should
appear in the vigilance plan in order to avoid unnecessary risks, including
potential tort liability. Good corporate practice of more information gathering
and sharing would therefore not necessarily affect the arm’s length relationship
between companies and their suppliers.
Given their increasingly important role in global governance, a regulatory
environment incentivizing MNEs to engage in self-observance and the effective
governance of human rights in their extraterritorial activities will also be
necessary, until such time as (and even after) MNEs become directly legally
166. Collins, supra note 30, at 743.
167. Sandra Cossart, Jerome Chaplier & Tiphaine Beau De Lomenie, The French Law on Duty
of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 317,
320, 323 (2017).
168. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L. 225-102-4 (Fr.);
Mark B. Taylor, Due Diligence: A Compliance Standard for Responsible European Companies, 11
EUR. COMPANY L. 86, 86 (2014).
169. Cossart et al., supra note 167, at 320. See also C. COM art. L. 225-102-4(1) (Fr.).
170. C. COM. art. L. 225-102-4(1).
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accountable for their human rights abuses. In this regard, the Illegal Logging
Prohibition Act 2012 (ILP Act) in Australia provides a novel supplementary
regulation mode. Instead of directly targeting wrongdoers who are engaged in
illegal logging activities in a foreign jurisdiction and thereby risking accusations
of the abuse of jurisdiction, the ILP Act provides “a mechanism for the
prosecution of downstream activities ancillary to the illegal logging” (i.e.,
importation and processing).171 By reducing the markets for unlawful goods
and services, this kind of “downstream regulatory scheme in developed states
can indirectly strengthen compliance with the law in developing states” without
risking accusations of cultural invasion172 and thereby reconciling relationships
between home and host states in jointly tackling human rights abuses in global
supply chains.
In addition to more effective punishments or sanctions to deter non-disclosure
or poor-quality disclosure, the creation of incentivizing structures within the law
would also help. For example, “public procurement guidelines based on
corporate social responsibility standards”173 could potentially form the basis of
incentivizing governance methods.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The “non-territorial spaces and management systems”174 of MNEs and the
global regulatory gaps that spring from them have provided the impetus for
intense academic and strategic attention, and a consequent range of regulatory
attempts. In transnational supply chains, “business entities are able to capitalize
on the labor practices of contractors and suppliers in foreign states with whom
they have an arm’s-length relationship.” 175 The opacity of supply chains
further makes it possible to straddle a thin line between lawful employment and
slavery or forced labor.

171. Turner, supra note 16, at 207. See also Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012, (Cth) ss
15, 17 (Austl.).
172. Turner, supra note 16, at 207.
173. Id. at 190. For instance, “the procurement practices and decisions of wholesalers and
retailers could limit the ability of consumers to purchase [slavery-]tainted goods and services.” Id.
at 196.
174. John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, Actors, and
Practices, 10(4) EUR. J. INT’L RELATIONS 499, 503 (2004).
175. Turner, supra note 16, at 208.

Winter 2020]Supply Chain Disclosure under the Modern Slavery Act

161

As global governance initiatives to encourage due diligence and combat
exploitation in multinational supply chains proliferate, home state regulation of
the global supply chains of corporations and the outsourcing activities of other
multinational business entities is increasingly gaining momentum. The U.K.
has been a pioneer as regards global supply chain regulation and has made some
commendable attempts—both in case law, which embodies a hard law duty of
care owed by focal companies towards parties affected by their overseas
subsidiaries, and in statutory requirements embedded in the MSA. However,
after an examination of the interactions between these regulatory methods,
particularly the legal and institutional factors hindering companies from making
detailed and substantial disclosures under Section 54 of the MSA, we have
identified an urgent need for a more fine-grained and coherent regulatory
framework, which can effectively reflect the volatile regulatory, normative, and
cultural environments that global supply chains encompass. Clear lines need to
be drawn as regards a corporation’s sphere of accountability in the globalized
context. Furthermore, the statutory steering of CSR, particularly supply chain
disclosure laws, should not be the major regulatory method to improve labor
practices in transnational supply chains. It should be part of a comprehensive
strategy, within a framework that is designed to both incentivize supply chain
sustainability and penalize business entities with supply chains that involve
illicit labor practices.176 This will require coherent and compatible progression
along several paths — extraterritorial jurisdiction, an extended duty of care for
focal companies, and even downstream regulatory schemes, to name but a few.
While home state regulation has to a certain extent offset the regulatory gap
in international law by way of forming an “expanding web of liability,”177 the
“geopolitical and geo-economic” tension implicated in regulating transnational
business enterprises should not be overlooked. 178 To end this institutional
scourge and encompass MNEs within coherent home state and extraterritorial
176. Id. at 209.
177. Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry & Mark B. Taylor, Translating Unocal: The
Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 841, 894 (2009).
178. Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, Written Statement Submitted by Law Society
of England and Wales, 1st Sess, U.N. Doc A/HRC/WG. 16/1/NGO/6, at 6 (July 2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Session1.aspx.
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regulatory regimes requires movements both at and beyond the regulatory level.
For example, the complexity of institutional environments necessitates
adaptations to “some of the most prominent features of the current world polity
and economy:” the structural and compositional complications of global chains,
national competition for markets and foreign investment, state sovereignty,
coherence between human rights law and corporate law, the highly contested
legitimacy of extraterritorial jurisdiction—the list goes on. 179 Indeed, as
commented by Ruggie, while our hearts drive our instinct to eradicate modern
slavery in supply chains, we still need our heads to develop suitable strategies to
“steer the heart through the very difficult global terrain on which we are
travelling.”180

179. Ruggie, supra note 4, at 170–71.
180. Id. at l.

